2025 Market Review: Money, Gold, and Cycles

这篇由典型”达利欧式（Ray Dalio）“宏观逻辑驱动的文章，是对刚刚过去的2025年全球市场的一份深度复盘。它不仅是一份业绩报告，更是一篇关于 “货币价值、财富转移与大周期（Big Cycle）” 的宏观哲学。

文章的核心观点极具冲击力：虽然2025年美国股市账面表现不错，但如果换算成金钱（黄金）或者其他强货币，美股实际上是贬值的。 2025年真正的赢家不是AI，而是黄金。

核心逻辑：货币贬值驱动的“幻觉”增长

作者认为，2025年市场最本质的故事不是”美股走强”，而是 “法币（纸币）走弱”。

1. 黄金的绝对统治： 黄金在2025年回报率高达65%（以美元计），不仅跑赢了标普500（18%），更是唯一的”硬通货”。
2. 货币购买力侵蚀： 以美元计，美股涨了18%；但如果以黄金计（即”金本位”），美股实际上下跌了28%。这意味着，虽然你的账户数字增加了，但你相对于黄金的实际购买力却大幅缩水了。
3. 汇率的”透视镜”： 2025年美元相对人民币、欧元、瑞郎等均在贬值。对于欧洲投资者来说，持有的美股扣除汇率因素后仅剩4%的微薄收益。

2025年主要资产回报率对比（美元计价）

市场异象：美股的“内强外干”

文章指出，尽管AI概念火热，但2025年美股在全球范围内其实是 显著落后（Underperform） 的。

1. 区域性逆转： 欧洲股市、中国股市、英国股市甚至日本股市，在2025年的回报均显著超过了美国。这标志着全球资本正在从美国市场向外流出和重新配置。
2. 盈利真相： 标普500的12%盈利增长中，有43%来自于利润率的提高（可能归功于AI驱动的效率提升），而非全靠销量增长。
3. 资本与劳动的撕裂： 利润的增长主要落入了资本家（股东）口袋，而劳动者分配到的份额较少。这埋下了社会矛盾的伏笔。

宏观风险：五个大周期的共同作用

作者利用其标志性的“大周期”框架，分析了驱动2026年及未来走向的几大力量：

1. 债务与金钱 (Debt/Money)
   • 美债面临约10万亿美元的到期滚动压力。
   • 由于美元价值下降，外国投资者对美债的兴趣正在减弱。
   • 作者预期收益率曲线会进一步陡峭化，且不看好长期债券。
2. 内部政治 (Domestic Politics)
   • 特朗普政府的影响： 一方面通过去监管、关税支持资本主义；另一方面，这种政策加剧了贫富差距。
   • 2026中期选举预判： 这种通胀压力（Affordability Issue）可能导致共和党失去众议院，引发2027-2028年更激烈的左右派对抗。
3. 地缘政治 (Geopolitics)
   • 世界正从“多边主义”转向“单边主义”（权力说了算）。
   • 制裁风险和脱钩压力促使全球投资者配置黄金，避开美元资产。
4. 技术与自然 (Tech & Nature)
   • AI泡沫： AI已进入泡沫早期阶段。
   • 气候变化： 尽管政策重心转向传统能源生产，但自然界的威胁依然存在。

投资建议与总结

文章最后给出了非常明确的“避坑”建议：

• 警惕昂贵的资产： 目前美股PE倍数高、信用利差低，预期回报率仅为4.7%，甚至低于某些债券收益率，股权风险溢价极低。
• 看淡流动性差的项目： VC（风险投资）、PE（私募股权）和房地产正面临高利率下的融资困境和估值下调压力。
• 战略配置： 建议投资者通过黄金和非美资产进行多元化，不要盲目迷信美股。

Naturally, as a systematic global macro investor leaving 2025, I reflected on the mechanics of what happened, particularly in the markets. That’s what today’s reflection is about.

作为一个系统性全球宏观投资者，在告别2025年之际，我一直在反思这一年事件背后的运作机理，特别是在市场层面。这正是今天这篇反思的重点所在。

Though the facts and returns are indisputable, I see things differently from most others. While most people see US stocks and particularly US AI stocks to be the best investments and hence the biggest investment story of 2025, it is indisputably true that the biggest returns (and hence the biggest story) came from 1) what happened to the value of money (most importantly the dollar, other fiat currencies, and gold) and 2) US stocks significantly underperforming both non-US stock markets and gold (which was the best performing major market) principally as a result of fiscal and monetary stimulations, productivity gains, and big shifts in asset allocations away from US markets. In these reflections, I step back and look at how this money/debt/market/economy dynamic worked last year, and I briefly touch on how the other four big forces—politics, geopolitics, acts of nature, and technology—affected the global macro picture in the context of the evolving Big Cycle.

尽管事实与回报率无可争辩，但我的视角与大多数人截然不同。大众普遍视美股——尤其是美国的AI股票——为2025年的最佳投资，并认为这构成了当年最大的投资话题。然而，无可辩驳的事实是，最大的回报（自然也是最大的看点）实则源于：1）货币价值（主要是美元、其他法币以及黄金）的变动；以及 2）美股显著跑输非美股市和黄金（其中黄金是表现最好的主要市场），这主要归因于财政与货币刺激、生产力提升以及资产配置大规模从美国市场外流。在这篇反思中，我将退后一步，审视去年货币、债务、市场与经济之间究竟是如何互动的，并简要探讨在“大周期”不断演进的背景下，另外四大力量——政治、地缘政治、自然之力和技术——是如何影响全球宏观格局的。

注释与解析

1. Systematic global macro investor (系统性全球宏观投资者)：指采用自上而下的分析方法，基于宏观经济趋势（如经济增长、通胀、利率、地缘政治）在股票、债券、货币和大宗商品等全球范围内寻找获利机会的投资者。这里的“系统化”通常暗示其决策依赖于量化模型或既定的规则体系，而非仅凭直觉。
2. US AI stocks (美国AI股票)：指美国人工智能领域的科技股（如NVIDIA, Microsoft, Google等）。
3. Underperforming (跑输/表现不佳)：金融术语，指某项资产的投资回报率低于基准或其他同类资产。在此语境下，意味着投资者如果全仓美股，其收益将低于投资非美股市或黄金。
4. Fiscal and monetary stimulations (财政和货币刺激)：分别指政府通过增加支出或减税来刺激经济（财政），以及中央银行通过降息或印钞来增加流动性（货币）的政策。
5. Asset allocations (资产配置)：投资者将资金在不同资产类别（如股票、债券、现金、实物资产等）之间进行分配的策略。文中提到“away from US markets”，即资金从美国市场撤离，流向其他地区或资产类别。
6. Money/debt/market/economy dynamic (货币/债务/市场/经济的动态交织)：强调了宏观经济分析中这些要素相互影响、互为因果的复杂关系。
7. The Big Cycle (大周期)：这是此处的一个核心概念（常与雷·达里奥 Ray Dalio 联系在一起），指跨越数十年甚至更长的长期经济周期，通常包括债务周期、地缘政治周期等因素的演变。
8. Acts of nature (自然之力/自然灾害)：在宏观经济学中，这一术语通常指气候变化、干旱、洪水、流行病等非人为因素的突发事件，它们会对农业生产、供应链和经济活动产生重大影响。

Regarding 1) what happened to the value of money: the dollar fell by 0.3% against the yen, 4% against the renminbi, 12% against the euro, 13% against the Swiss franc, and 39% against gold (which is the second largest reserve currency and the only major non-fiat currency).  So, all fiat currencies fell, and the biggest story and the biggest market moves of the year were the result of the weakest fiat currencies falling the most, while the strongest/hardest currencies strengthened the most. The best major investment of the year was long gold (returning 65% in dollar terms), which outperformed the S&P index (which returned 18% in dollars) by 47%. Or, said differently, the S&P fell by 28% in gold-money terms.  

关于第一点，即货币价值的变动：美元对日元下跌了0.3%，对人民币下跌了4%，对欧元下跌了12%，对瑞士法郎下跌了13%，而对黄金下跌了39%（黄金是第二大储备货币，也是唯一主要的非法币）。

由此可见，所有法币都贬值了，而年度最大的看点和最大的市场波动，源于最弱的法币跌得最惨，而最强/最硬的货币涨得最猛。今年最好的主要投资是做多黄金（以美元计价回报率为65%），其表现跑赢了标普500指数（美元回报率18%）47个百分点。或者换句话说，若以黄金计价，标普500指数实则下跌了28%。

Let’s remember some key principles that pertain to what is happening:

• When one’s own currency goes down, it makes it look like the things measured in it went up. In other words, looking at the investment returns through the lens of a weak currency makes them look stronger than they really are. In this case, the S&P returned 18% for a dollar-based investor, 17% for a yen-based investor, 13% for a renminbi-based investor, only 4% for a euro-based investor, only 3% for a Swiss franc-based investor, and, for a gold-based investor, it returned -28%.

  当本国货币贬值时，会使以该货币计量的商品看起来价格上涨了。换句话说，透过弱势货币的透镜去观察投资回报，会让它们显得比实际情况更强劲。在这种情况下，对于持有美元的投资者，标普500指数的回报率为18%；持有日元的投资者为17%；持有人民币的投资者为13%；持有欧元的投资者仅为4%；持有瑞士法郎的投资者仅为3%；而对于持有黄金的投资者，回报率为-28%。

• What happens with the currency matters a lot to shifts in wealth and what happens economically. When one’s currency goes down, it reduces one’s wealth and one’s buying power, it makes one’s goods and services cheaper in others’ currencies, and it makes others’ goods and services more expensive in one’s own currency. In these ways, it affects inflation rates and who buys what from whom, though it does so with a lag.  Whether or not you are currency hedged matters a lot.  What if you don’t have, and don’t want to take, a view on the currency?  What should you do?  You should always be hedged to your least-risk currency mix and make tactical moves from there if you think you are capable of making them well. I won’t digress now into an explanation of how I do that, though I will later.

  货币的走势对财富转移以及经济运作有着重大影响。当货币贬值时，会减少人们的财富和购买力；使该国的商品和服务在别国货币看来更便宜；同时使别国的商品和服务在该国货币看来更昂贵。通过这些方式，货币变动会影响通胀率以及买卖双方的交易流向，尽管这种影响存在滞后性。是否进行货币对冲至关重要。如果你没有、也不愿对货币走势持有某种预判，你该怎么办？你应该始终对你的最低风险货币组合进行对冲，如果你认为自己有能力在此基础上做好进一步的战术性调整，再进行操作。我现在不会离题去解释我是如何做到的，尽管稍后会提到。

• As for bonds—i.e., debt assets—because they are promises to deliver money, when the value of money goes down, their real worth is lowered even as their nominal prices rise. Last year, 10-year US Treasury bonds returned 9% (roughly half from yield and half from price) in dollar terms, 9% in yen terms, 5% In renminbi terms, and -4% in euro terms, -4% in Swiss franc terms, and -34% in gold terms—and cash was an even worse investment. You can see why foreign investors didn’t like dollar bonds and cash (unless they were currency hedged). Thus far, the bond supply/demand imbalance has not been a serious problem, but a large amount of debt (nearly $10tn) will need to be rolled going forward. At the same time, it appears likely the Fed will be inclined to ease to push real interest rates down. For these reasons, debt assets look unappealing, especially at the long end of the curve, and a further steepening of the yield curve seems probable, though it seems questionable to me that the Fed’s easing will be as much as is discounted in the current pricing.

  至于债券——即债务资产——因为它们本质上是对交付货币的承诺，所以当货币价值下降时，即使其名义价格上涨，其实际价值也会缩水。去年，10年期美国国债以美元计价的回报率为9%（约一半来自收益率，一半来自价格上涨），以日元计价也是9%，以人民币计价为5%，以欧元计价为-4%，以瑞士法郎计价为-4%，而以黄金计价则为-34%——持有现金是更糟糕的投资。由此你可以理解，为什么外国投资者不喜欢美元债券和现金（除非他们进行了货币对冲）。

  迄今为止，债券的供需失衡尚未成为严重问题，但未来将有大量债务（近10万亿美元）需要展期。与此同时，美联储似乎倾向于放宽政策以压低实际利率。基于这些原因，债务资产看起来缺乏吸引力，尤其是收益率曲线的长端部分。收益率曲线进一步陡峭化的可能性似乎很大，不过在我看来，美联储目前的宽松幅度能否达到当前市场定价所预期的程度，是值得怀疑的。

注释与解析

1. Illegal/Non-fiat currency (非法币)：指不由政府信用背书、具有内在价值的货币，这里特指黄金。与之相对的是法币，即由国家法律宣布强制流通的纸币。
2. Long gold (做多黄金)：金融术语，指买入黄金或持有黄金头寸，期望其价格上涨从而获利。
3. Currency hedged (货币对冲)：一种通过金融衍生品（如远期合约、期权）来消除汇率波动风险的策略。例如，一家外国公司投资了美国资产，为了避免美元贬值换回本币时亏损，它可以进行货币对冲锁定汇率。
4. Tactical moves (战术性操作)：指在既定战略框架下，根据短期市场变化进行的灵活调整。
5. Real worth vs. Nominal prices (实际价值 vs. 名义价格)：名义价格是资产面上的价格数字，而实际价值扣除了通货膨胀或货币购买力变化的影响。
6. Rolled (展期/滚动)：在债务领域，指当旧的债务到期时，借入新的债务来偿还原有债务，从而延长还款期限的操作。
7. Long end of the curve (收益率曲线的长端)：收益率曲线是显示不同期限债券收益率的图表。“长端”指的是长期债券（如10年期、30年期国债）的区域。
8. Steepening of the yield curve (收益率曲线陡峭化)：指长期债券的收益率相对于短期债券的收益率上升，导致收益率曲线变得更陡。通常这发生在经济预期增长或通胀预期上升时。
9. Discounted (计入/贴现)：在金融语境中，指市场当前的资产价格已经反映了对未来事件的预期。文中意思是：市场的当前价格暗示了投资者预期美联储会进行大幅度的宽松。作者对此表示怀疑。

Regarding 2) US stocks significantly underperforming non-US stocks and gold (which was the best performing major market), as previously mentioned, while US stocks were strong in dollar terms, they were much less strong in the currencies that were strong, and they significantly underperformed other countries’ equities. Clearly, investors would have much rather been in non-US stocks than in US stocks, just as they would have preferred to be in non-US bonds than in US bonds and US cash. More specifically, European stocks outperformed US stocks by 23%, Chinese stocks outperformed by 21%, UK stocks outperformed by 19%, and Japanese stocks outperformed by 10%. Emerging market stocks as a whole did better, returning 34%, while emerging market dollar debt returned 14% and emerging market local currency debt in dollar terms returned 18% as a whole. In other words, there were big shifts in flows, values, and, in turn, wealth away from the US, and what is happening will probably lead to more rebalancing and diversifying.

关于第二点，即美股显著跑输非美股票和黄金（后者是表现最好的主要市场）：如前所述，尽管美股以美元计价表现强劲，但在那些强势货币面前其表现便相形见绌，并且显著跑输其他国家的股票。

显而易见，投资者本更倾向于持有非美股票而非美股；同理，相比于美债和美元现金，他们也更偏好非美债券。具体来看，欧洲股票跑赢美股23%，中国股票跑赢21%，英国股票跑赢19%，日本股票跑赢10%。新兴市场股票总体表现更佳，回报率达到34%；同时，新兴市场美元债券回报率为14%，而以美元计价的新兴市场本币债券总体回报率为18%。

换言之，资金流动、资产价值，进而包括财富，都发生了大规模从美国向外转移的迹象；眼下的事态发展很可能将引发更多的资产组合再平衡与多元化配置。

注释与解析

1. Underperform/Outperform (跑输/跑赢)：金融常用术语。文中提到“European stocks outperformed US stocks by 23%”，指欧洲股市的回报率比美股高出23个百分点。这意味着如果投资者选择欧股而非美股，将获得显著的超额收益。
2. Emerging market dollar debt (新兴市场美元债)：指新兴市场国家发行的以美元计价的债券。对于美国投资者来说，这类债券没有汇率风险（除非发行国违约），因为本金和利息都是美元支付。
3. Emerging market local currency debt in dollar terms (以美元计价的新兴市场本币债券)：指新兴市场国家发行的以本国货币（如巴西雷亚尔、印度卢比）计价的债券，但将其回报换算成美元来衡量。如果本币对美元升值，这对美国投资者来说是一层额外的收益；反之则是损失。文中提到该回报为18%，说明这些非美货币相对美元表现较好，或者债券本身的收益率很高足以抵消汇兑损失。
4. Shifts in flows (资金流动的转移)：指投资者资金在不同市场或资产类别之间的大规模迁移。这里特指资本从美国市场撤出，流向欧洲、中国、日本及新兴市场。
5. Rebalancing (再平衡)：在投资组合管理中，指调整资产配置比例以恢复到目标权重，或者根据市场变化调整投资策略。这里暗示投资者正在减少对美国资产的过度依赖，增加对其他地区资产的配置。
6. Diversifying (多元化)：通过将投资分散到不同的资产类别、行业或地理区域来降低风险的策略。文中建议通过增加非美资产来实现这一目的。

As for US stocks last year, the strong results were due to both strong earnings growth and a P/E expansion. More specifically, earnings were up 12% in dollar terms, the P/E rose by about 5%, and the dividend yield was about 1%, so the total return of the S&P was about 18% in dollars. The “Magnificent 7” stocks in the S&P 500, which account for about a third of its market cap, had earnings growth of 22% in 2025, and, contrary to popular thinking, the other 493 stocks in the S&P also had strong earnings growth at 9%, so the whole S&P 500 index had earnings growth of 12%. That happened as a result of sales increasing by 7% and margins increasing by 5.3%, so sales were responsible for 57% of the earnings increase and margin improvements were responsible for 43% of it.* It appears that some significant portion of the margin improvements was due to technology efficiencies, but I can’t see the numbers to tell for sure. In any case the earnings improvements were largely due to the economic pie (i.e., sales) increasing and companies (hence the capitalists who own them) capturing most the improvement and workers capturing relatively little of it.  It will be very important to monitor the margin increases that go to profits going forward because the markets are now discounting that these increases will be large while leftist political forces are trying to capture a greater share of the pie.

至于去年的美股，其优异表现既源于强劲的盈利增长，也得益于市盈率（P/E）的扩张。具体而言，以美元计价的盈利增长了12%，市盈率上升约5%，股息率约为1%，共同使得标普500指数的美元总回报达到了约18%。标普500指数中的“七巨头”股票约占其市值的三分之一，2025年的盈利增长率为22%。而出乎普遍意料的是，标普500指数中其余的493只股票也实现了9%的强劲盈利增长，因此整个指数的盈利增长率达到了12%。这一增长源于销售额增长了7%以及利润率提高了5.3%。因此，销售额增长贡献了57%的盈利增幅，而利润率改善则贡献了剩下的43%。¹ 看来利润率的改善中有相当大一部分归功于技术带来的效率提升，但限于数据细节，我无法百分百确定。

无论如何，盈利的改善很大程度上源于“经济蛋糕”（即销售额）的做大，且企业（进而指拥有企业的资本家）攫取了其中的大部分收益，而工人分得的份额相对寥寥。未来密切监测转化为利润的利润率增长将至关重要，因为当前市场定价已预期此类增长将十分可观，但与此同时，左派政治力量正试图从这块蛋糕中攫取更大的份额。

注释与解析

1. P/E expansion (市盈率扩张)：指股票价格增长速度超过了公司每股收益的增长速度，导致市盈率（股价/每股收益）上升。这通常意味着投资者愿意为每单位收益支付更高的价格，反映了市场乐观情绪或估值泡沫。
2. The “Magnificent 7” stocks (七巨头股票)：这是一个美股市场术语，指七家主导美国股市的大型科技公司，通常包括苹果、微软、 Alphabet (Google)、亚马逊、英伟达、Meta 和特斯拉。它们对标普500指数的走势有着举足轻重的影响。
3. Dividend yield (股息率)：指一年的总派息额除以当时股价，代表投资者通过持有股票获得的现金回报率。
4. Margins (利润率)：通常指净利润率，即公司每获得一美元销售收入能转化为多少利润。技术效率（如AI应用）通常能降低成本，从而提高利润率。
5. Discounting (预期/计入)：金融术语，指市场的当前价格已经反映了对未来事件的预期。文中意为：大家买股票时，已经假设未来的利润率会很高了；如果这一预期没有实现，股价可能会下跌。
6. Capture a greater share (攫取/获取更大份额)：这里指的是通过税收、提高工资、反垄断等财富再分配手段，让劳动者或政府从企业利润中分走更多，从而减少资本方的利润。

While it is easier to know the past than the future, we do know something about the present that can help us better anticipate the future if we understand the most important cause/effect relationships. For example, we know that with PE multiples high and credit spreads low, valuations appear to be stretched. If history is a guide, this portends low future equity returns. When I calculate expected returns based on where stock and bond yields are using normal productivity growth and the profits growth that results from it, my long-term equity expected return would be at about 4.7% (a sub-10th percentile reading), which is very low relative to existing bond returns at about 4.9%, so equity risk premiums are low. Also, credit spreads contracted to very low levels in 2025, which was a positive for lower credit and equity assets, but it leaves these spreads less likely to decline and more likely to rise, which is a negative for these assets. All this means that there isn’t much more return that can be squeezed out of the equity risk premiums, credit spreads, and liquidity premiums. It also means that if interest rates rise, which is possible as there are growing supply/demand driven pressures (i.e., supply is increasing while the demand picture is worsening) to have happen because the value of money is declining, all else being equal, it will have a large negative effect on the credit and stock markets.

Of course, there are big questions about Fed policy and productivity growth ahead. It appears most likely that the newly appointed Fed chair and the FOMC will be biased to push nominal and real interest rates down, which would be supportive to prices and inflate bubbles. As for productivity growth, it will likely improve in 2026, though a) how much it will improve and b) how much of it will be allowed to flow through to benefit company profits, stock prices, and, in turn, capitalist owners versus how much will go to workers and socialists in the form of comp changes and taxes (which is the classic political right/left question) are uncertain.

尽管回顾过去比展望未来要容易，但如果我们能洞悉其中最重要的因果关系，我们所掌握的关于当下的信息便有助于更好地预判未来。例如，鉴于当前市盈率（PE）高企且信贷利差极低，资产估值似乎已处于过高水平。若以史为鉴，这预示着未来的股票回报率将十分低迷。当我基于当前的股票和债券收益率，结合正常的生产率增长及其带来的利润增长来测算预期回报时，得出的长期股票预期回报率约为4.7%（处于历史后10%的分位水平）。这与约4.9%的现有债券回报率相比非常低，意味着股票风险溢价已处于极低水平。

此外，信贷利差在2025年已收缩至极低水平，虽然这对低评级信贷和股票资产构成了利好，但也意味着这些利差进一步下降的空间变小，而反弹上升的可能性增加，这对这些资产而言反而是个不利信号。²这一切意味着，从股票风险溢价、信贷利差和流动性溢价中，已经难以榨取更多的回报空间。这也意味着，如果利率上升——鉴于货币价值贬损，目前由供需驱动的压力正在增大（即供应增加而需求前景恶化），这种情况是有可能发生的——那么在其他条件不变的情况下，将对信贷和股票市场产生巨大的负面影响。

当然，对于美联储政策及未来的生产率增长，仍存在重大的不确定性。最有可能的情况是，新任美联储主席及联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）将倾向于压低名义利率和实际利率，这虽会支撑资产价格，但也会助长泡沫的形成。至于生产率增长，预计在2026年将会改善，但存在两点不确定性：a) 改善的幅度会有多大？以及 b) 改善带来的收益中有多少会被允许流向公司利润、股价，进而惠及资本所有者，又有多少会以薪酬调整和税收的形式流向工人和社会主义者？（这正是经典的左派与右派政治博弈问题）。

注释与解析

1. Valuations appear to be stretched (估值显得过高/紧绷)：在金融语境中，“Stretched” 意味着资产价格相对于其基本面（如收益、现金流）已经超越了正常的历史范围，暗示估值昂贵且可能缺乏弹性，容易回调。
2. Sub-10th percentile reading (低于第10百分位的读数)：统计学概念，意味着当前的测算结果在历史数据分布中处于最低的10%区间内。在此语境下，强调了股票预期回报之低在历史上是极其罕见的。
3. Credit spreads (信贷利差)：指公司债收益率与无风险国债收益率之间的差额。利差收窄通常代表投资者对风险资产的偏好增加，愿意接受较低的额外风险补偿；但也意味着未来利差走阔（债券价格下跌）的风险在积聚。
4. Lower credit (低评级信贷)：指信用评级较低（如非投资级或高收益债券）的债务资产。这类资产通常对利率和信贷利差的变动更为敏感。
5. Equity risk premiums (股票风险溢价)：指投资者投资股票相对于无风险资产（如国债）所要求的额外回报率。当该溢价过低时，说明股票相对于债券的风险补偿不足，通常预示着股票预期回报不佳。
6. Liquidity premiums (流动性溢价)：指投资者因持有难以快速变现的资产而要求的额外收益。当市场流动性充裕时，这部分溢价会被压缩。
7. Nominal and real interest rates (名义利率与实际利率)：名义利率是未经过通胀调整的利率；实际利率是扣除通胀后的真实回报率。压低实际利率通常被视为刺激经济和资产价格的手段。
8. Comp (Compensation) changes (薪酬变动)：“Comp” 是 Compensation 的缩写，指员工的工资、奖金和福利等。文中涉及到生产率提升后的利益分配问题，即收益是体现为企业的利润增长，还是转化为员工的工资增长。
9. The classic political right/left question (经典的右派/左派政治问题)：此处反映了经济哲学的分歧。右派（通常代表资本主义和自由市场）倾向于认为产出应归资本所有者和企业；左派（通常关注劳工平等和再分配）倾向于认为产出应更多通过高工资和税收的形式惠及工人和社会。

Consistent with how the machine works, in 2025 the Fed’s cutting interest rates and easing the availability of credit lowered the discount rate, determining the present value of future cash flows and lowering risk premia, which together contributed to the previously described results. These changes supported the prices of assets that do well in reflations, especially those with long-durations, like equities and gold, so now these markets are no longer cheap. Also, notably, these reflationary moves didn’t help venture capital, private equity, and real estate—i.e., the illiquid markets—very much. Those markets are having problems. If one believes the stated valuations in VC and PE (which most people don’t), liquidity premiums are now very low; I think it’s obvious that they are likely to rise a lot as the debt these entities took on has to be financed at higher interest rates and the pressures to raise liquidity build, which would make illiquid investments fall relative to liquid ones.

In summary, just about everything went up a lot in dollar terms because of the big fiscal and monetary reflationary policies and are now relatively expansive.

正如这台经济机器的运作规律所示，2025年美联储降息并放宽信贷条件，从而降低了折现率，锁定了未来现金流的现值，并压低了风险溢价，这些因素共同造就了前述的市场结果。这些变化推升了那些在再通胀时期表现优异的资产价格，尤其是具备长久期属性的资产，如股票和黄金，因此如今这些市场已不再便宜。

此外，值得注意的是，这些再通胀举措并未对风险投资（VC）、私募股权（PE）和房地产——即流动性较差的市场——起到太大的助益。这些市场正面临困境。如果有人相信风险投资和私募股权领域的账面估值（大多数人并不相信），那么目前流动性溢价已处于极低水平；我认为显而易见的是，这一溢价极有可能会大幅上升，因为这些实体承担的债务必须以更高的利率进行再融资，且提升流动性的压力正在积聚，这将导致非流动性投资的表现相对于流动性资产出现下跌。

综上所述，受大规模财政和货币再通胀政策的推动，几乎所有资产以美元计价都大幅上涨，目前的估值也相对扩张（昂贵）。

注释与解析

1. How the machine works (机器的运作规律)：这里借用了Ray Dalio（瑞·达利欧）常用的“经济机器”比喻，指代经济运行内在的机械性、因果循环机制。此处特指货币政策（降息）如何通过金融传导机制（折现率、现金流）影响资产价格。
2. Refations (再通胀)：指通过货币政策或财政政策刺激经济，以阻止通货紧缩或对抗经济衰退，通常会导致货币供应量增加和资产价格上升。
3. Long-durations (长久期)：金融术语。“久期”衡量的是资产价格对利率变动的敏感度。长久期资产（如成长型股票、不产生利息的黄金）意味着其现金流主要来自于遥远的未来，因此当利率下降（折现率降低）时，其现值的上涨幅度会远大于短久期资产。
4. Illiquid markets (非流动性市场)：指像VC、PE和房地产这样难以在短时间内以合理价格变现的市场。与之相对的是“Liquid markets”（如公开交易的股票市场）。
5. Liquidity premiums (流动性溢价)：指投资者因为持有非流动性资产而要求获得的额外收益回报。文中指出，如果这些资产的账面估值不缩水（甚至被认为是合理的），意味着投资者现在几乎不需要额外的补偿来冒险持有非流动性资产，即流动性溢价极低，但这违背了常理，预示着未来风险较大。
6. Relatively expansive (估值相对扩张/昂贵)：在这里指资产价格的上涨幅度已经超过了基本面价值的增长，导致估值倍数（P/E等）变高，资产变得“昂贵”。

One cannot look at the changes in the markets without looking at the changes in the political order, especially in 2025. Because markets and the economy affect politics and politics affect markets and the economy, politics played a big role in driving markets and economies. More specifically in the US and for the world:

a) the Trump administration’s domestic economic policies were and still are a levered bet on the power of capitalism to revitalize American manufacturing and enable American AI technology, which contributed to the market movements I described above,

b) its foreign policy has scared and turned off some foreign investors as fears of sanctions and conflicts supported the sort of portfolio diversification and buying of gold that we saw, and

c) its policies increased wealth and income gaps because the “haves” (those in the top 10%), who are capitalists, have more wealth in stocks and because their income gains were   bigger.

As a result of c), those capitalists who are in the top 10% now don’t see inflation as a problem, while the majority (those in the bottom 60%) feel overwhelmed by it. The value of money issue, otherwise known as the affordability issue, will probably be the number one political issue next year, contributing to the Republicans losing the House and a very messy 2027 on the way to a very interesting 2028 election in which the clash between the right and the left is shaping up to be a big one.

若要审视市场的变化，绝不能脱离对政治秩序演变的观察，尤其是在2025年。鉴于市场与经济影响政治，而政治反过来也影响市场与经济，政治因素在推动市场与经济发展的过程中扮演了举足轻重的角色。具体而言，对美国乃至全球来说：

a) 特朗普政府的国内经济政策（过去是，现在依然）是一场“加注”式的押注，即依托资本主义的力量来重振美国制造业并推动美国人工智能（AI）技术的发展，这正是促成前述市场变动的因素之一；

b) 其外交政策令部分外国投资者感到惊恐并望而却步，鉴于对制裁和冲突的担忧，投资者纷纷寻求投资组合多元化并购入黄金，这正是我们所见证到的市场动向；

c) 其政策加剧了财富与收入的不平等，因为作为资本家的“富人”（即前10%的人群）持有更多的股票财富，且他们的收入增幅也更大。

c)点所带来的结果是，处于前10%的资本家如今并不视通胀为问题，而绝大多数人群（处于后60%的阶层）则感到深受其苦（无力应对）。货币价值问题，也即“购买力”问题，很可能将成为明年的头号政治议题。这将导致共和党失去众议院的控制权，并导致通往2028年大选之路上的2027年变得异常混乱，而在那场大选中，右派与左派之间的对抗似乎正在酝酿成一场激烈的交锋。

注释与解析

1. A levered bet (加注式的赌注)：在金融中，“杠杆”是指利用借来的资金进行投资，以放大潜在回报（同时也放大风险）。这里用“levered bet”形容特朗普政府的政策，意味着这是一种高风险、高回报的激进策略，完全依赖资本主义的活力奏效，一旦失败，后果也会被放大。

2. Turned off (疏远/失去兴趣)：这里指外国投资者因为政策的不确定性或对抗性而感到厌恶，从而减少了投资意愿。

3. Portfolio diversification (投资组合多元化)：是一种风险管理策略，将资金分配到不同的资产类别中以减少风险。文中提到因担心制裁和冲突而进行多元化，意味着投资者正在减少对单一市场（可能是美国）或单一资产类别的依赖。

4. Overwhelmed by it (感到不知所措/深受其苦)：指底层的60%人群在面对通货膨胀时，生活成本上升的压力超过了他们的承受能力，感到无力应对。

5. Affordability issue (购买力/生活成本问题)：在政治经济语境下，指由于物价上涨速度快于收入增长速度，导致普通民众买不起原本负担得起的生活必需品（如住房、食品、能源）。这是选民最关心的民生问题之一。

6. Losing the House (失去众议院)：指在美国国会中期选举或常规选举中，共和党未能保住众议院的多数席位。这将阻碍该党通过立法议程。

7. The clash between the right and the left (右派与左派的冲突)：

   • 右派：通常主张自由市场资本主义、低税收、放松管制、传统价值观，强调经济效率和资本所有者的利益。
   • 左派：通常主张社会平等、高税收（针对富人）、加强公共服务、政府干预，强调劳工权益和财富再分配。
   • 文中暗示这一冲突将在2028年大选中达到顶峰。

More specifically, 2025 was the first year of the Trump four-year term in which he had control of both houses, which is classically the best year for presidents to push through what they want, so we saw his administration’s all-out aggressive bet on capitalism—i.e., the aggressively stimulative fiscal policy, reducing regulations so that money and capital would be more plentiful, making it easier to produce most things, raising tariffs to both protect domestic producers and to bring in tax revenue, providing proactive supports to key industries’ production. Behind these moves, there was a Trump-led shift from free-market capitalism to government-directed capitalism.

Because of how our democracy works, President Trump has a two-year unimpeded mandate that can be weakened greatly in the ‘26 mid-term elections and reversed in the ‘28 elections. He must feel that this doesn’t give him enough time to get done what he believes he needs to get done. Nowadays, it is rare for one party to be able to stay in power for long because it is difficult for them to live up to their promises to satisfy their electorates’ financial and social expectations. In fact, there is reason to question the viability of democratic decision-making when those in office are unable to govern long enough to meet the voters’ expectations. It is becoming a norm in developed countries to see populist politicians from the left or the right who advocate for extreme policies to bring about extreme improvements and then fail to deliver and are thrown out of office. These frequent changes from one extreme to another are destabilizing. It’s like it used to be in underdeveloped countries. In any case, it is increasingly apparent that a big fight is brewing between the hard right, now led by President Trump, and the hard left. On Jan 1, we saw the opposition coalescing as Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez united at Mamdani’s inauguration behind the anti-billionaire, “Democratic socialist” movement. This will be a fight over wealth and money that will likely affect the markets and economies.

Regarding how the world order and geopolitics are changing, in 2025 there was a clear shift from multilateralism (in which there is an aspiration to operate by rules overseen by multilateral organizations) to unilateralism (in which power rules and countries operate in their self-interest). That raised and will continue to raise threats of conflict and lead to increased military spending, and borrowing to finance it, in most countries. It also contributed to the increased use of economic threats and sanctions, protectionism, deglobalization, many more investment and business deals, more foreign capital promised to be invested in the United States, strengthening demand for gold, and reduced foreign demand for US debt, dollars, and other assets.

Regrading acts of nature, the progression of climate change continued while there was a politically led Trump shift in spending money and encouraging energy production in an attempt to minimize the issue.

Regarding technology, obviously the AI boom that is now in the early stages of a bubble had a big effect on everything. I will soon send out an explanation of what my bubble indicators are showing, so I won’t get into that subject now.

具体而言，2025年是特朗普四年任期的第一年，且他掌控了国会两院，这通常被认为是总统推行其主张的最佳时机，因此我们见证了其政府对资本主义展开的“全力豪赌”——即实施激进的财政刺激政策、放松监管以使资金和资本更加充裕、让大多数产品的生产变得更容易、提高关税以保护国内生产商并增加税收收入，以及对重点行业的生产提供积极支持。在这些举措背后，是一场由特朗普主导的、从自由市场资本主义向政府主导型资本主义的转变。

鉴于我们的民主运作方式，特朗普总统拥有两年“畅通无阻”的执政期，但这可能在2026年中期选举中被大幅削弱，并可能在2028年大选中被彻底逆转。他肯定觉得这留给他完成其认为必须完成之事的时间并不充裕。如今，单一政党能够长期执政的情况已属罕见，因为要想兑现承诺以满足选民的经济和社会期望并非易事。事实上，当执政者无法在足够长的任期内满足选民的期望时，我们就有理由质疑民主决策机制的可行性。在发达国家，一种常态正在形成：左翼或右翼的民粹主义政客倡导极端政策以带来极度改善，随后却因无法兑现承诺而被赶下台。这种在两极之间频繁更迭的局面具有破坏性。这就像过去发展中国家常经历的那样。无论如何，以特朗普总统为首的极右翼与极左翼之间，一场激烈的对抗正在酝酿，这一点已日益明显。1月1日，我们目睹了反对派的集结：佐赫兰·马姆达尼、伯尼·桑德斯和亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特兹在马姆达尼的就职典礼上团结一致，共同投身于反亿万富翁的“民主社会主义”运动。这将是一场关于财富和金钱的较量，很可能会影响市场和经济发展。

关于世界秩序和地缘政治的演变，2025年出现了一个从多边主义（渴望在多边组织监督下按规则行事）向单边主义（实力至上，各国出于自身利益行事）的明显转变。这已经引发并将继续引发冲突威胁，导致大多数国家增加军费开支，以及为此进行的借贷。这也导致了经济威胁和制裁、保护主义、去全球化的加剧，促成了更多的投资和商业交易，以及更多承诺投向美国的外国资本（增强了黄金需求），同时减少了对美国国债、美元及其他资产的外国需求。

关于自然因素，气候变化的进程仍在持续，与此同时，出现了由特朗普政治主导的支出转向和鼓励能源生产的举措，试图淡化（应对）这一问题。

关于技术领域，显而易见的是，正处于泡沫初期的人工智能（AI）热潮对一切事物都产生了重大影响。我不久后将发送一份关于我的泡沫指标所显示内容的说明，因此在此我就不深入探讨这一话题了。

【注释与解析】

1. Control of both houses (掌控两院)：指美国总统所在的政党同时控制了美国国会的参议院和众议院。这使得总统在立法议程上面临的阻力最小。

2. All-out aggressive bet (全力豪赌)：指特朗普政府采取了一种不留后路、高强度的策略，试图通过极其激进的手段（如大规模减税、放松管制）来刺激经济。

3. Government-directed capitalism (政府主导型资本主义)：与传统的自由市场资本主义相对，指政府在资源配置、产业规划和经济方向上发挥主导或决定性作用的经济模式。文中指出特朗普虽然标榜资本主义，但实际上在推行有政府干预的模式。

4. Viability of democratic decision-making (民主决策的可行性)：作者在此处提出一个深层担忧：由于选举周期的限制，政治家倾向于短视，无法实施长期有效的政策（因为长期政策可能在短期内痛苦且无法在连任前见效），从而质疑民主制度在应对长期复杂挑战时的有效性。

5. Hard right vs. Hard left (极右翼 vs. 极左翼)：

   • 极右翼：通常指强烈的民族主义、保守主义、反移民、主张不受约束的自由市场（但在特朗普这里结合了贸易保护主义）。
   • 极左翼：通常指主张激进的社会财富再分配、高税收、加强社会福利和劳工权益，如文中提到的“民主社会主义者”。

6. Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism (多边主义 vs. 单边主义)：

   • 多边主义：指三个或以上的国家在处理国际关系时，通过国际组织（如联合国、WTO）和共同规则来协调行动。
   • 单边主义：指大国强国依据自身实力和利益独自采取行动，无视国际规则或其他国家的意见，常伴随着霸权主义色彩。

7. Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez：均为美国左翼政治人物。

   • 佐赫兰·马姆达尼：纽约州众议员，以进步派立场著称。
   • 伯尼·桑德斯：资深参议员，美国现代民主社会主义运动的代表人物。
   • 亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特兹 (AOC)：著名的众议员，也是民主社会主义的代表人物。文中设定他们在2025年联合，象征着左翼势力的集结。

8. Minimize the issue (淡化/减轻这一问题)：指在应对气候变化问题上，特朗普政府倾向于不将其视为首要危机，而是通过加大能源生产（可能指化石燃料）来降低能源成本，从而在政治上“淡化”气候问题的紧迫性。

9. Early stages of a bubble (泡沫初期)：指资产价格（或在此处指AI相关资产估值）开始脱离基本面，由过度乐观和投机驱动的阶段，作者认为AI热潮正处于这一阶段。

That’s a lot to think about, and we didn’t cover much about what’s going on outside the US.  I have found that having an understanding of the patterns of history and the cause/effect relationships that drove them, having a well back tested and systemized game plan, and using AI and great data is invaluable. That’s how I play the game and what I want to pass along to you.

In summary, this approach has led me to believe that the debt/money/markets/economy force, the domestic political force, the forces of geopolitics (e.g., increased military spending and borrowing to finance it), the force of nature (climate), and the force of new technologies (e.g., the costs and benefits of AI) will continue to be the major drivers shaping the whole picture, and that these forces will broadly track the Big Cycle template I laid out in my books. As I have already gone on for too long, I won’t go deeper into all this now. If you read my book How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle, you know what I think about how the cycle will evolve, and if you want to learn more and haven’t read it, I suggest that you do.

As for portfolio positioning, while I don’t want to be your investment advisor (meaning I don’t want to tell you what positions to have and have you simply follow my advice), I do want to help you invest well. Though I think you can surmise the types of positions I like and don’t like, the most important thing for you to have is the ability to make your investment decisions yourself, whether to place your own bets on which markets will do well and poorly, or to build a great strategic asset allocation mix that you stick with, or to pick managers who will invest well for you. If you want my advice about how to do these things well to help you be successful at investing, I recommend the Dalio Market Principles ourse which is put out by the Wealth Management Institute of Singapore.